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Abstract
Background: India has been at the forefront of innovations around social accountability mechanisms in improving
the delivery of public services, including health and nutrition. Yet little is known about how such initiatives are
faring now that they are incorporated formally into government programmes and implemented at scale. This
brings greater impetus to understand their effectiveness. This formative qualitative study focuses on how such
mechanisms have sought to strengthen community-level nutrition and health services (the Integrated Child
Development Services and the National Rural Health Mission) in the state of Odisha. It fills a gap in the literature on
considering how such initiatives are running when institutionalised at scale. The primary research questions were
‘what kinds of community level mechanisms are functioning in randomly selected villages in 3 districts of state of
Odisha' and 'how are they perceived to function by their members and frontline workers’.
Methods: The study is based on focus group discussions with pregnant women and mothers of children below
the age of 2 (n = 12) and with women’s self-help groups (n = 12); interviews with frontline health workers (n = 24)
and with members of community committees (n = 36). Interviews were analysed thematically using a priori coding
derived from wider literature on key accountability themes.
Results: Four main types of community-based mechanisms were examined – Mothers committees, Jaanch
committees, Village Health and Sanitation Committees and Self-Help Groups. The degree of their effectiveness
varied depending on their ability to offer meaningful avenues for participation of their members and empower
women for autonomous action. Notably, in most of these mechanisms community participation is very weak, with
committees largely controlled by the frontline workers who are supposed to be held to account. However, self-help
groups showed real levels of autonomy and collective power. Despite not having an explicit accountability role,
these groups were nevertheless effective in advocating for better service delivery and the broader needs of their
members to a level not seen in institutional committees.
Conclusions: The study points to the need for community-level mechanisms in India to adequately address issues
of participation and empowerment of community members to be successful in contributing to service
improvements in health and nutrition.
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Background
Context
India is a middle-income country that performs rela-
tively poorly on health and social development indica-
tors relative to its level of economic growth [1]. Despite
being a signatory to a number of international treaties
and instruments which promote access to healthcare
and nutrition [2], ensuring community level delivery of
health and nutrition services remains a major challenge,
particularly to disadvantaged populations [3]. Whilst in-
dicators are improving, the progress is slower than it
would be desired under ambitious health policy goals.
Government funding and investment on health and nu-
trition services were increasing until recently, though
the overall health expenditure is still low at around 1.3%
of GDP [4]. However, even with this continued need for
further public investment, there is also an argument
(shared by those on both sides of the political spectrum)
to ensure that governance failures concerning imple-
mentation do not also lead to chronic deficiencies in de-
livery in some of these flagship programmes. These
include the Integrated Child Development Services
(ICDS) and the National Health Mission (NHM - previ-
ously National Rural Health Mission), which are the
focus of the paper here (Table 1).
These twin challenges exist in a context of India’s
federal system, where health and nutrition programs are
designed and (partially) funded at federal level and im-
plemented at state level. Each of India’s 29 States has the
flexibility to augment the basic requirements set down
by laws and policies developed in Delhi and is also ex-
pected to significantly contribute to funding service de-
livery from State revenues. The context provides room
for state-led innovation - seen as critical to effective
health delivery, but which remains under-documented in
the academic literature [5].
In recognition of the challenges around governance
and implementation [6], part of what has been mandated
by policy makers at national level [7] is increased moni-
toring of the delivery of services at community level by
community members/service users themselves. This re-
flects the fact that India has been at the center of social
innovation in community monitoring and accountability
and social auditing in many sectors [8], where civil soci-
ety have pioneered a number of community monitoring
and accountability systems, some of them now inte-
grated into government programmes [8]. For instance,
the ICDS and NHM have undergone efforts to
strengthen community participation and oversight by
decentralizing service delivery and investing in existing
community-level groups and local governance institu-
tions (the latter known collectively as Panchayati Raj
Instutions (PRIs) from an older system of Panchayats or
village assemblys).
Table 1 Background on Village level health and nutrition programmes
The Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS)
Launched in 1965, ICDS is designed to provide integrated health, nutrition and education services for children from 0 to 6 years of age and for
pregnant and lactating mothers. The scheme is overseen nationally by the Ministry for Women and Child Development (WCD). Services are provided
through Anganwadi Centres (AWCs), served by honorary but compensated staff members, the Anganwadi worker (AWW) and Anganwadi helper
(AWH). Each AWC caters to a population of approximately 1000, with the roles of AWWs and AWHs usually assumed by women appointed within
the community.
To date, the ICDS structure has concentrated on delivering a package of interventions focused on the following six areas:
• Supplementary nutrition;
• Growth monitoring;
• Maternal and female health counselling;
• Immunisation;
• Wider health and referral services; and
• Pre-school education.
The National Health Mission
Delivery of a wider set of “nutrition-specific” interventions proven to have an impact on maternal and child undernutrition (Bhutta et al. 2013) is
dependent on a number of wider health services provided to the community (Avula et al. 2015). This includes services funded and delivered by the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare through the National Health Mission (NHM, formerly National Rural Health Mission), an umbrella scheme
launched by the Central Government in 2005 with the objective of reducing the maternal mortality, infant mortality and total fertility rates. The NHM
provides for a number of service guarantees free of cost to individuals living below the poverty line (BPL) (NRHM Service Guarantees, GoI). These
include services such as:
• Antenatal care (ANC) check-ups;
• Cash benefits encouraging institutional delivery;
• Postpartum visits and IYCF counselling service;
• Supplementation of Iron and Folic Acid (IFA) from twelve weeks of pregnancy; and
• Prevention and control of childhood diseases like malnutrition.
Importantly, the scheme introduced the role of ‘Accredited Social Health Activists’ (ASHAs)a to serve at community-level as the main link between
health supply and demand. Similar to AWWs, ASHAs are female honorary volunteers selected from the community and are therefore uniquely placed
to provide health and nutritional counselling and services in a complementary manner. Another key figure in the delivery of NHM services is the
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM), whose role is to supervise and guide ASHAs and AWWs in tasks related to the NHM.
aFor more details see panel in Balarajan et al. 2011:511
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Within this context, this research began as a piece of
formative study to support the trial of a community ac-
countability mechanism focused on improving the ICDS
and NHM in the Indian State of Odisha, as they are the
two main programmes responsible for the delivery of
health and nutrition services.
Recent research has recognized Odisha as an innova-
tive state with a strong bureaucracy [9, 10], albeit a state
which still suffers significantly from poverty and inequal-
ity. Innovation in service delivery has included the im-
plementation of a number of nationally mandated and
state-specific initiatives focused on community account-
ability in relation to the ICDS and NHM. The aim of
this research was to scope how such initiatives are actu-
ally functioning on the ground and to ascertain the
views of service users and frontline workers on their
current functioning and on wider governance challenges.
This paper, therefore, is intended to be of benefit to those
who want to understand the implementation of such initia-
tives in the context of large-scale public health systems, and
particularly against the backdrop of under-researched inno-
vations occurring in India’s federal structure. As well as
documenting important initiatives designed to improve
both governance and implementation, evidence on the
functioning of community accountability mechanisms at
scale helps meet a gap in the development literature which
results from the pilot or trial nature of many initiatives to
date.
Concepts and frameworks
This study falls within a wider literature concerning citi-
zens’ participation and social accountability in health ser-
vice delivery, which has now been covered extensively in
several literature reviews [11–15]. A number of studies
discuss and evaluate citizen-led action for holding govern-
ments accountable for the delivery of public services, in-
cluding healthcare, housing, social welfare benefits etc.
[16, 17]. Within this broad literature, a sub-set of studies
focuses on community-based mechanisms that enable citi-
zens to engage with local authorities and service providers,
broadly termed ‘social accountability’ and/or ‘transparency
and accountability initiatives’ [18, 19].
Community monitoring can be institutionalized and
embedded into government programs, or led by stake-
holders other than state institutions, such as civil society
groups, community based groups and consumer groups.
Key means of involving communities in holding service
providers accountable include mechanisms such as mon-
itoring committees, citizen juries, scorecards and social
audits [16, 20].
Some of the results reported through these initiatives
can include increased transparency and participation in
decisions concerning service delivery, reduction in cor-
ruption practices, improvements in availability and
quality of services, and overall changes in power dynam-
ics between citizens and service providers. Crucial to the
impact of these initiatives are factors such as the quality
of participation of community members [21]; the need
for these mechanisms to be ‘vertically integrated’ to ad-
dress bottlenecks in service delivery at different levels of
the supply chain [22, 23]; and the need to trigger sanc-
tions (or the threats of ) [24]. At broader level, these
types of initiatives should not be seen as technical ‘wid-
gets’ but rather sustained efforts that engage politically
with states and service providers [25, 26] and address
power dynamics underpinning service delivery, which
make a crucial difference in ensuring access to services
for marginalized groups such as women and indigenous
people. At a local level, effective accountability mecha-
nisms require building inclusive spaces for community
participation, whether institutional or informally estab-
lished, which can reduce ‘asymmetrical power relations’
[14] between local service providers and community
members. However if participation is not meaningful,
the responsiveness of providers to accountability
demands is significantly weaker [15]. For this reason,
successful accountability initiatives focus on building
awareness, confidence and capacity of community mem-
bers and ensuring an adequate facilitation of dialogue
between citizens and providers [27, 28].
While bearing in mind the broader literature, and con-
cerns about the need for strategic, comprehensive ap-
proaches, this study focuses on accountability initiatives
operating at a local level, through institutional spaces for
participation aimed at improving the delivery of health
and nutrition services [7, 29–31]. Factors identified as
crucial in the literature - such as the quality of participa-
tion within different committees/spaces, the dynamics
between citizens and service providers, and actions and
impact on service delivery at community level, are thus
the primary focus of this exploratory study.
Methods
The findings of this study are based on primary and sec-
ondary data. The field research took place in between
December 2015 and January 2016 and consisted of 24
focus group discussion and 60 interviews conducted in
twelve villages across the districts of Sundarghar, Khand-
hamal and Mayurbhanj. The districts were selected as
part of a process for a wider trial which followed three
purposive criteria: a) population: all districts have a high
proportion of ‘Scheduled Tribe’ population, who are
poorer than other social groups, have lower access to
health services and substantially higher under-five
mortality and stunting rates [32]; b) malnutrition rates:
one of the districts selected (Sundargarh) has high
prevalence of moderate and severe malnutrition (20,27 -
28,29% compared to State average of 17%), and two
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(Kandhamal and Mayurbhanj) have lower rates of mal-
nutrition (NOP, 2009–13); and c) multiplicity of health
and nutrition supply programs and community account-
ability mechanisms: two of the Districts selected (Kand-
hamal and Sundargarh) are areas of ‘high-focus’ of
intervention for the Government of Odisha [33] to im-
plement additional health and nutritional programs, in-
cluding community accountability mechanisms to raise
awareness and participation in ICDS and NHM services;
while one District (Mayurbhanj) is not covered by these
additional programs [33]. In each district, villages were
stratified between those located close to district head-
quarters and those located in more remote areas, and
two villages from each stratum were selected randomly.
The field research was conducted by a team of four
skilled qualitative researchers under the supervision of a
local survey firm and the lead author.
Secondary data included government documents such
as guidelines, informational material and policy docu-
ments issued by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry
of Women and Child Development. In addition, grey lit-
erature on community-level accountability mechanisms
was used to shape the following section describing the
institutional background of these accountability mecha-
nisms, which is an existing gap in the literature.
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 describe the participants who were
part of the 24 focus group discussions and 60 interviews
(hereafter ‘respondents’). These respondents were se-
lected with the help of local frontline workers (the limi-
tations of this are discussed below) on the basis of their
role in relevant local groups and their willingness and
availability to participate in the study.
The research tools (Additional file 1, Additional file 2,
Additional file 3 and Additional file 4) were designed to
elicit the perceptions of service users, frontline workers
and committee members on the delivery of health and nu-
trition services and the role of the committees in ensuring
more accountable service delivery. Interviews were
semi-structured, focusing on the availability and quality of
existing health and nutrition services, the functioning of
village-level committees, including the quality of participa-
tion and the potential for addressing gaps in service deliv-
ery. This format also allowed for un-elicited responses
about quality of services or outcomes.
Data analysis was based on narrative and content ana-
lysis of the interview transcripts and the secondary data,
respectively. The analysis of interviews transcripts paid
particular attention to triangulation, by cross-referencing
different groups’ answers on broader issues. This allowed
consideration of the varying perspectives on the role of
frontline workers, the social status of women and the
underlying factors that contribute to health and poverty,
as well as helping to highlight the underlying biases
expressed by different groups of respondents.
One limitation of this study was selection bias related to
the role of frontline workers, as part of a wider process of
‘elite capture’ in the village. Research participants were
identified by frontline health and nutrition workers,1
namely Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) and
Anganwadi Workers (AWW)2 who are likely to have se-
lected among women who are more sympathetic towards
their work as well as more aware of their entitlements
under health and nutrition schemes. Nonetheless, even
given this potential bias, respondents raised a number of
concerns with the implementation of health and nutrition
schemes, and critical gaps in the role of frontline workers.
These form valuable findings reported here.
Results
Documenting decentralization and accountability in the
delivery of health and nutrition services in India
In India, the two main policies providing for the delivery
of health and nutrition services, the ICDS and NHM,
have undergone efforts to decentralize service delivery
and expand community participation into the govern-
ance of public services. To increase accountability and
citizen participation, the Government established a num-
ber of community-level governance mechanisms, namely
Table 2 Groups interviewed and methods
Community members entitled to ICDS and NHM services
Pregnant women and mothers of below
2 years old children
Focus Group Discussions (n = 12)
(ie 1 per community)
92 individual participants in the FGDs
Frontline health and social workers
ASHAs Semi-structured interviews (n = 12)
Anganwadi Workers Semi-structured interviews (n = 12)
Representatives of community-level groups
Jaanch Committee Semi-structured interviews (n = 12)
Mothers Committee Semi-structured interviews (n = 12)
Gaon Kaliani Samity (GKS) Semi-structured interviews (n = 12)
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) Focus Group Discussions (n = 12) 109 individual participants in the FGDs
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committees and groups formed by community members,
frontline health and nutrition workers and representa-
tives of local institutions.
The implementation of ICDS services underwent a deep
decentralization process following intervention of the
Supreme Court of India in 2001, 2004 and 2006. In a land-
mark judgment on 13th December 2006, the Court
ordered the government to ensure “universalisation with
quality” and provided measures to decentralize procure-
ment, monitoring and oversight of services at local level,
including mandating the role of local women’s Self Help
Groups and Mahila Mandals (women’s groups)3 [34] in
purchasing supplies and preparing and distributing food.
In Odisha, local stakeholders were also awarded a major
role in monitoring and, to some extent implementing, ser-
vice delivery through ad-hoc committees: namely Jaanch
Committees and Mothers Committees [35].
In Odisha, Self Help Groups (SHGs) are mostly com-
posed of women classified as living “below poverty line”
from a specific area [36]. SHGs can be established or
run by AWWs, who in most cases have a major role in
mobilizing women, but they also may be established in-
dependently. The purpose of SHGs is to build women’s
economic empowerment and financial independence
by obtaining loans and investing it in income generating
activities for its members. However, SHGs are also in-
volved in the delivery of health and nutrition services [36],
including by procuring and cooking hot meals to be dis-
tributed through Anganwadi Centres (see fn. 2).
Jaanch committees [37] (JCs) are formed by five to six
members selected among the community and including
one retired person, one disabled person, the Mothers’
Committee Chairperson and two members from a local
SHG (usually President and Secretary). JCs are tasked
with monitoring different aspects of the feeding
programs undertaken in AWCs, for instance by oversee-
ing distribution of hot cooked meals and morning
snacks which are distributed to women and children en-
rolled at the AWC.
The Mothers committee (MC) is an all women com-
mittee formed by the local ASHAs, a representative
from the Panchayat (usually a woman ward member),
two members of the SHG, a NGO representative, and
one member from each category of beneficiaries: preg-
nant and lactating women and mothers of children from
6 months to 6 years old selected among community
members. MCs have both implementation and monitor-
ing functions. MCs support Anganwadi Workers in the
delivery of their services. With regards to their monitor-
ing and oversight role, MCs are tasked with ensuring
quality of the food rations distributed at the AWC, in-
cluding by being present during distribution of
take-home rations, and ensuring timely opening of
the AWC and home visits by the AWW.
Over a similar period to the universilisation of the
ICDS, the National Health Mission (launched in 2005 as
the National Rural Health Mission) has been developed
to mirror Panchayat Raj Institutions, which are the pri-
mary governance mechanisms at community level.4
The NHM provides for the establishment of Village
Health and Sanitation Committee, (Gaon Kalyan Samitis,
hereafter GKS) at the village level and Hospital
Management Committees attached to lower level health
facilities, i.e. Primary Health Centres and Community
Health Centres. The GKS are composed of the local
ASHA and/or AWW, a representative from the Panchayat
(usually a ward member), a representative from the
Department of Women and Child Development (usually
the Auxiliary Nurse Midwive), two or three representatives
from SHGs and a representative from a local NGO.
Table 4 Caste composition of respondents - % of respondents
Committee members AWWs ASHAs Mothers & Pregnant Mothers
SC 43 9 18 48
ST 25 46 46 17
OBC 19 18 9 19
Other 13 9 9 0
No data 0 18 18 16
Table 3 Education level of respondents - % of respondents
Committee members AWWs ASHAs Mothers & pregnant mothers
No education 68 0 0 30.5
0-8th Standard 5 36 45.5 27
9–10th Standard 11 55 54.5 31.5
University education 0 0 0 1
No data 16 9 0 10
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The primary functions of these committees are plan-
ning, implementing and monitoring interventions
around health, water and sanitation at village level by
developing a health plan based on the village situation
and priorities identified by the community. To this end,
interventions can range from conducting household sur-
veys, awareness raising on health and WASH, as well as
maintenance of the village environment [38]. GKS have
an untied annual fund of Rs. 10,000 which can be spent
towards activities planned by the Committee. The fund-
ing gives GKS more leverage than other village-level
committees to improve service delivery. In an effort to
increase transparency and accountability of local service
delivery, GKS are also meant to collect data on the
community and share it with the village council (Gram
Sabha) to better coordinate development interventions.
Community level findings
The findings from the primary research consider the
role of community-level mechanisms in making service
delivery more responsive to the needs of women and
children under 2.
The data collection paid particular attention to ser-
vices targeted to children under 2 and their mothers, in-
cluding post-natal care, counseling on infant and young
child feeding and supplementary nutrition, given the im-
portance of interventions within the ‘1000 day window
of opportunity’ in avoiding mortality and morbidity and
lifelong health and developmental consequences [39] .
Results from the interviews conducted with pregnant
and lactating women in each village expose gaps in
delivering food rations and ensuring access to
facility-based and home-based healthcare. Table 6 sum-
marizes key findings emerging from their perceptions
and experience. The data confirm numerous challenges
in the implementation of ICDS and NRHM which are
Table 6 Summary of key interview findings - interviews with pregnant women and mothers of children under 2
Type of service
used/available
Issues identified by mothers Relation with FLWs
A. Access to
health facilities
Out of pocket expenditures: including for transportation
to/from the facility, payments made once at the facility
towards health staff or hospital attendants, and at times
towards the purchase of equipment and medicine.
(existing government policies mandate free transport,
treatment and services for women from lower income groups).
ASHAs play an essential role in facilitating access to services
and cash entitlements,. This included check-ups and institutional
deliveries, which were the services with highest demand among
women. In such cases, ASHAs play a key role in arranging
transportation by ambulance and, once at the facility,
obtaining care promptly.
Check-ups and institutional deliveries are also the main
requirements for obtaining cash benefits under government
schemes designed to encourage demand of health services
among below poverty line women
Respondents faced delay in obtaining care due to referrals from
lower-end facilities (such as Primary Health Centers) to higher
facilities (such as Community Health Centers and
District Level Hospitals). In some cases, referrals take place
because of lack of adequate facilities
and qualified health staff in lower hospitals.
Inadequacy of health facilities: for instance poor hygienic
conditions and lack of services which discourage women
from seeking institutional care
Discrimination on grounds of tribal status: respondents
reported being treated poorly by health staff on the basis
of their tribal status.
B. Take home rations Take home rations are distributed irregularly and the amount
is not sufficient: reported waiting time ranged from weeks to
three months (in one case). In most cases, availability of eggs
was found to be particularly challenging.
The quality of the relation with the AWW generally depends on
mothers’ satisfaction with the delivery of take home rations.
Although the lack of timely or sufficient distribution of rations
may be due to issues beyond the control of AWWs, respondents
associated the performance of AWW with the effectiveness and
quality of the food received.Poor quality: In some cases, rotten food distributed as take
home ration caused sickness among women and children.
Inaccessibility: women find it difficult to collect the ration
from the AWC due to long working hours
(AWC distribution ends around 2 pm).
IYCF Counselling IYCF advice, through retained by mothers, is not being
put into practice. Factors such as poverty, inability to
purchase nutritious food, the need to work long hours
and in harsh conditions even during pregnancy,
prevent them from ensuring adequate nutrition to
their children.
Both AWWs and ASHAs are key players in IYCF counselling,
which takes place through ad-hoc sessions (Village Health and
Nutrition Days) usually held at AWCs. ASHAs also undertake
home visits during which they provide IYCF counselling.
Home-based care is highly valued by respondents albeit
(or precisely because) is not perceived as a duty of ASHAs
but rather an ‘extra-mile’ task that she does voluntarily.
Table 5 Average age of respondents
Average age
Committee members 38.4
AWWs 42.6
ASHAs 37.7
Mothers and pregnant mothers 24.5
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well-documented in existing research on these two pro-
grammes [40–42] and include: experience of inadequate
or low quality services; delays and irregularities; discrim-
ination and mistreatment; inaccessibility; and the need
for more practicable, and contextually appropriate care
and advice. AWWs and ASHAs were also found to be
important in accessing and directing services at this
local level, with mothers considering them to have
agency over processes deemed important, such as the
delivery of take home rations and home-based advice. In
addition, ASHAs seem to enjoy higher authority and sta-
tus compared to AWWs, perhaps because of their cru-
cial role in facilitating access to health services within
and outside the village.
Theoretically, accountability mechanisms, including
the committees identified here, could play a role in im-
proving the experience of health and nutrition services
by helping monitor the work of frontline workers; in-
creasing opportunities for collaboration between the com-
munity and workers; identifying structural gaps in the
service delivery system and raising awareness of services
amongst the community. Against this background, the fol-
lowing section describes the functioning of each of the
committees examined, particularly looking at members’
motivations, patterns of participation and actions taken:
Jaanch committees
Respondents reported that they had little or no interest
in being part of this committee. Primarily, they were se-
lected because they fitted into a required (demographic)
category (retired, disabled…) and not because they had a
genuine interest in being involved in the Committee. In
fact, only a small number were aware of the nature of
duties and able/willing to attend to the meetings, as one
respondent noted:
“The AWW madam gives the names of the villagers
according to her own choice even the JC members
don’t know that they are the members of this
committee.” (Jaanch Committee member)
Confusion about roles and duties of members is also
compounded by the fact that some of the respondents
were members of multiple committees (e.g. GKS and JC).
Among respondents who felt more motivated, the sense of
playing an important role in the community was the main
factor for becoming a member of the Committee.
Seven respondents were actively engaged in monitor-
ing of food distribution although the nature of their
contribution was in question due to the fact that – ac-
cording to some of them - the process was entirely con-
trolled by the AWW. In fact, oversight was not focused
on the AWW but rather on the service users (children
or mothers), for instance by ‘making sure that children
wash their hands before eating.’ AWWs retain key in-
formation about what and how issues should be moni-
tored, and JC members act according to their guidance.
In some cases, respondents assisted the AWW in pro-
viding the service, such as by helping in cooking and/or
purchasing the food. Not all members knew how to
contribute, however. Half of the respondents neither
had roles to play, nor knew what should be expected
from them.5
Mothers committees
Members were identified and selected by the AWW, so
they joined the Committee under the guidance of AWW
and were accountable to her. They had a personal stake
in ensuring the AWC ran smoothly because they were
also users of the AWC. For instance, by being members
they learned about the government services available to
pregnant and lactating women. As with members of the
Jaanch Committees, another motivation for being a
member of the Committee was community recognition:
“Some mothers listen to my information and care for
me. That’s why I am feeling happy to work in this
sector”.
Listing the type of action undertaken, members de-
scribed the committee’s role as serving the community
by providing information or helping individuals to access
services. Seven respondents reported that the Commit-
tee checks the distribution of take-home rations to chil-
dren and mothers. Six respondents said that the
committee counsels mothers on health and nutrition, in-
cluding counseling around nutrition and feeding prac-
tices and facilitating communication between mothers
and frontline workers. One respondent mentioned moni-
toring of home visits. Another four respondents men-
tioned monitoring the delivery of health services such as
Tetanus Toxoid injections, blood pressure tests and
vaccinations.6
Gaon Kaliani Samiti (village health nutrition and sanitation
committees)
In line with their mandate, interviewees noted how
whilst GKSs were regularly seen to conduct many activ-
ities to do with water, sanitation and health, little visible
action was taken on nutrition. Estimates were that about
one third of the funding received is spent on the com-
mittees’ own administration: ASHAs, AWWs and ward
members, who are all core members of the GKSs, re-
ceive between Rs 50 and Rs 150 for attending GKS
meetings, usually convened by the AWW once a month.
Beyond administration, it was reported that GKS fund-
ing is allocated towards employing village members to
fund small public works, including keeping the village
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environment clean, repairing tube wells, building plat-
forms in the village wells and cleaning the drainage sys-
tem, at times conducted in coordination with the Block
Development Office (local administration department).
A smaller portion of the funding was reported to be
allocated towards promoting healthcare. Here, the role
of GKS was two-fold. In most cases the Committee pro-
vided financial assistance to individuals in need: for example
for purchasing medicines or accessing government hospi-
tals, therefore using the Committee’s funding to overcome
shortcomings of the public health system (since under the
NHM medicine and ambulance services should be provided
free of costs). In a smaller number of cases GKSs organized
public awareness activities such as street plays on malaria
prevention. However, interviewees unanimously reported
that GKS funding is insufficient to carry out (and sustain)
the activities required, and that not all GKSs received the
disbursement according to the schedule planned.
Self help groups
SHGs offer a radically different example of
community-level committee based on mutual savings and
other collectively beneficial activity. In all villages covered
by the study there was more than one SHG (up to six in
one case).
Members reported that meetings were held once or
twice a month, with the first time for discussing the
amount of money that needs to be contributed and the
second one to bring a contribution, which is expected of
everyone. Attendance at meetings was reported to be
very high.
While their main focus is not health and nutrition,
SHGs are the only platform, among those examined in
the study, to tackle the issues that respondents have
identified as (individual and collective) priorities and
which are important underlying or basic drivers of
health and nutrition outcomes. These included (as men-
tioned by respondents): poverty and lack of purchasing
power, long working hours and heavy workload, gender
based violence (often linked to alcohol abuse) and dis-
crimination based on ethnicity and gender.
In addition, in many cases SHGs can play a direct role
in facilitating access to services, especially counseling
around nutrition and feeding practices. Half of the re-
spondents mentioned the role of SHGs members in pro-
viding counseling through home visits, and bridging
between pregnant and lactating women and frontline
workers. In several other cases SHGs provided cash as-
sistance to pregnant women for medical emergencies,
while three respondents mentioned availing of the sup-
port of SHGs members to be accompanied to the hos-
pital. In other instances, SHGs played a role in raising
awareness on child marriage and nutrition entitlements.
AWWs’ perspectives According to AWWs interviewed,
there is a clear distinction between the role of JCs and
MCs. While the former plays a stronger oversight role,
for instance by ensuring records of food purchase are
updated, the latter focuses on supporting the work of
the AWW. According to AWWs, both committees help
increase demand for services among women, and as a
result increase attendance at AWCs for services like vac-
cination, take home rations and pre-school activities:
“JC has made my work simpler…. I would have faced
problems doing all this but as the members are
checking, I am not facing problems... The truth is,
those children who did not come to the school… They
are coming to school” (AWW)
In some instances, AWWs noted the important role
played by MC members in conveying nutrition and feed-
ing counseling to tribal women, who speak a different
language and would not otherwise be able to communi-
cate in Odiya (the mainstream language of the state).
Not all AWWs were satisfied about the work of com-
mittees. In many cases the lack of participation in com-
mittee meetings was perceived as a hindrance to the
functioning of the committee. Lack of attendance was
due to little time availability, expectations for incentives
(financial or otherwise) and sometimes hindrance
exerted by family members (husbands or in-laws), which
prevented women from participating.
AWW perspectives on GKS were similar to that noted
by others members above. Additionally AWWs noted
that funds management has in some cases been cumber-
some, as they reported experiencing a significant work-
load increase for maintaining records and withdrawing
the money, which gave rise to conflicts between AWWs
and ward members. AWWs also felt being pressurised
by community members to allocate the funding towards
specific activities.
Discussion
The results of the research reported here give a helpful
picture of how the community monitoring mechanisms
and committees mandated under national and state pol-
icies are functioning on the ground according to their
participants. In considering the constraints to their ef-
fective functioning, key themes noted in the conceptual
background section, above, appear relevant here – par-
ticularly with regards to the quality of participation, the
relationships that such initiatives broker between partici-
pants and beneficiaries and the ways in which they con-
tribute to a wider sense of empowerment of members.
Additional factors raised here include day-to-day prac-
tical constraints and incentives to effective participation
in the committees studied.
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Functioning of committees
According to relevant government policies, the commit-
tees’ mandate relates both to the implementation and
monitoring of service delivery. However, both due to the
elite capture described and the broader context of
under-resourced infrastructure, most of these committees
work as extension arms of frontline workers, carrying out
tasks and roles that service providers cannot do due to
lack of time, capacity and money. The monitoring poten-
tial of the committees is thus considerably reduced.
Among the committees examined, the GKS does not
exert monitoring functions, but is still seen as very im-
portant in the village because of the funding it has ac-
cess to. Unlike other committees, the impact of the GKS
in improving the overall health of the community is per-
ceived as visible and tangible to men and women alike.
The strength of the GKS is to fill gaps in service delivery
(water, health and sanitation) by funding some of the ac-
tivities that should be undertaken by the government. In
so doing, the GKS acts as a decentralized arm of govern-
ment, becoming a service provider itself.
JCs showed greater potential for monitoring the per-
formance of AWWs probably because there is a diversity
of members including men who are not service recipients,
which may help break the provider/users paradigm. How-
ever in light of the resource constrains and lack of clarity
over the purpose of the committee examined above, in
some cases the oversight focuses on service users (children
and women) rather than providers (AWWs).
Compared to JCs, MCs are designed to focus more on
service delivery than monitoring, and since committee
members are all dependent on frontline workers for
their access to health and nutrition, their monitoring po-
tential is very limited. In fact, messages delivered by re-
spondents to other service users (women and mothers
who are not part of the committee) reproduce the ser-
vice user-provider dynamic:
‘We tell them what they should eat and how much
rest they should take’ (Respondent)
Quality of participation and nature of the service-provider –
beneficiary relationship
The literature on participation highlights the importance
of ensuring meaningful participation in accountability
initiatives linked to improving service delivery. (21) In
the cases considered here, participation was strongly
linked with the sense of recognition that motivates
people to engage in the committees, the relevance of the
committee to the lives of those involved (e.g. mothers
participating in the mothers’ committee), and the effect-
iveness of the committee in improving existing services.
The findings show that most of the committees ana-
lysed, albeit described by this paper and by others as
‘community mechanisms’ are in fact institutionally
driven and have weak levels of community participation
(in terms of numbers and quality of participation). For
instance, in GKSs, a heavy presence of members who
represent service providers or government institutions
(frontline workers, members of PRI and government
representatives) leaves little or no space for engagement
of community members. In other instances, community
members lacked essential information on their role as
members and the overall purpose of committees, while
in other cases, they were not informed by AWWs about
the date and time of the meetings. Frontline workers
also maintain official records and deal with financial ad-
ministration of the committees, effectively playing as
gatekeepers.
Quality of participation can also be assessed by looking
at inclusion of marginalised individuals in the commit-
tees [27]. In the case of JCs, MCs and GKSs bureaucratic
and language barriers hindered meaningful participation
of marginalized individuals, especially of women with
tribal status. For instance, members are required to hold
adequate documentation (such as a BPL or Adhaar
cards7) in order to join MC and JC committees – a re-
quirement often unmet by marginalized women. In the
case of committee members from tribal communities,
language prevented meaningful engagement during
group meetings:
“There two mothers, who aren’t able to say anything...
no good Odia. We do discuss in local language…even if
we discuss that in our local language Kandha…then
also they just sit silently… They just say yes…whatever
we are saying to them, but say nothing.” (GKS member)
Broader practicality constraints and incentives to participation
In the case of MCs and JCs, meetings were poorly
attended by community members. AWWs unanimously
reported that the poor participation often disrupted the
schedule of meetings.
Respondents pointed to the lack of time for attending
meetings or carrying out committee-related activities.
This is especially true for poorer respondents, who are
employed as daily labourers, while most of the respon-
dents who were able to attend the meetings are house-
wives whose husbands have an occupation. All
respondents pointed to the need for rewarding members’
attendance with food or money in line with their wider
constraints on time and resources.
Yet time did not seem to be a factor constraining par-
ticipation to SHG meetings, which were very well
attended, even when held twice a month. Such a sharp
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difference in participation is attributable to the nature of
participation in JCs, MCs and GKSs compared to SHGs.
Here members join the group voluntarily and with a
clear purpose (income earning), which responds to the
needs and priorities expressed by women (overcoming
poverty). Though in the vast majority of cases SHGs
have been established by AWWs, or they hold key posi-
tions within it (Secretary or President), the SHGs do not
operate as an extension of the work of AWWs, and un-
like JCs or MCs, the power within the group is distrib-
uted more evenly. As one AWW put it:
“[The] difference [with] SHG groups is that they are
independent. Janch Committee has been selected from
the block level. Our villagers have selected the Mothers
Committee…. Nobody can tell SHG anything. They do
by their own wish.” (AWW, Kamhari Village)
Contributions to empowerment
A study on overall impacts within the broader account-
ability field has noted the difference between account-
ability initiatives that lead to service improvements and
ones that contribute to broader participation, empower-
ment and accountability [27]. The more positive re-
sponses regarding the functioning of the SHGs reported
here show that there are synergies between these two
types of outcomes. The power of SHGs appeared to lie
in their autonomy and ability to act as a powerful group
where women can benefit from peer support as well as
gain economic empowerment and confidence [28, 27].
All members have a clear stake in the group, and there
is a shared, high commitment to the success of its
activities.
The work of SHGs also contributes to women’s em-
powerment in several ways. Firstly, by increasing finan-
cial independence and increased decision-making power
over how to spend the money – both individually (earn-
ings) and as a group (loans). Secondly, SHGs effectively
create a sense of group and peer-solidarity and become a
platform for women to exert their voice and build col-
lective power. This has been essential for achieving im-
portant results such as closing down of unlicensed shops
selling alcohol (linked to gender based violence). Thirdly,
members feel more confident and empowered thanks to
the exposure and skills gained by engaging with external
stakeholders for business purposes.
SHGs are therefore percieved as a strong platform for
women’s empowerment and able to tackle issues that
hinder women’s access to health and nutrition services.
Service impacts and limits
In the few cases where these mechanisms are effective,
the impact seems clear and tangible in the perceptions
of their members. When committee members had a
genuine interest in the purpose of the committee and
elite capture did not undermine opportunities for moni-
toring and oversight, findings show improvements in
both the demand and supply of services.
Respondents highlighted improvements in both service
uptake (e.g. more children undertaking preschool educa-
tion, more women collecting food rations) and service
provision (better conditions of AWCs, more timely dis-
tribution of food rations and better communications be-
tween mothers/women and frontline workers). Some
respondents stressed the linkages between the oversight
role of committee members, and accountable and re-
sponsive AWWs:
“They are unable to hide things as we work honestly
and looking around every day (…) this is possible
because we came together” (MC member, Rayapalli
Village)
However, many of the gaps in the delivery of health
and nutrition services that were raised during group dis-
cussions with mothers may fall much beyond the control
of frontline workers. For instance, unavailability of food
stocks in AWCs results from bottlenecks within the
Food and Civil Supplies Department rather than on the
performance of specific AWWs. Similarly, the poor
availability of ambulances and quality healthcare in gov-
ernment hospitals are infrastructural issues for which
the Department for Health and Family Welfare is re-
sponsible. In cases when frontline workers are unable or
unwilling to respond to grievances raised by service
users, these are left with no other channel to refer their
grievance to. These limitations highlight the need for
community committees to be integrated with
higher-level grievance mechanisms able to address sys-
temic issues.
Conclusions
Community-based monitoring aims to ensure a more re-
sponsive and accountable delivery of essential services
by involving service users in the monitoring, oversight
and planning of those services. In India, community
monitoring mechanisms have been established within
wider decentralization efforts undertaken by the Govern-
ment. The two main policies providing for the delivery
of health and nutrition services, NHM and ICDS, envis-
age a number of community-based mechanisms formed
by community members, frontline health and nutrition
workers and representatives of local institutions which
are tasked to ensure effective and responsive delivery of
health and nutrition entitlements, particularly to women
and children.
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This study sought to understand the effectiveness of
such community-level mechanisms in the State of Odisha,
India.
Findings highlighted how in these institutionalized
mechanisms the participation of community members is
often tokenistic, as committees are effectively controlled
by the frontline workers who are supposed to be held
into account. The cases examined reveal a significant
degree of confusion between accountability and
decentralization functions, which these committees are
both invested with. The confusion stems from a lack of
meaningful participation of community members, who
are mostly not informed of the committees’ functions
and decision-making processes, and end up acting as ex-
tension arms of (often overworked) frontline workers. In
the few instances where these committees have been
able to oversee the performance of frontline workers,
with reported improvements in service delivery, they
have been unable to address wider, systemic issues along
the supply chain of health and nutrition services.
SHGs appear to stand out from the rest of the com-
mittees analysed. Important lessons can be drawn from
SHGs with regards to meaningful participation and
building of collective power [28], which are relevant to
the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. The au-
tonomy of the committee, members’ strong commitment
to the success of the group, and a common goal are
among its key strengths, along with the ability to respond
to real needs and priorities of women living in villages.
SHGs don’t have a specific mandate for monitoring and
overseeing service delivery, nonetheless they were re-
ported as playing a key role in addressing issues women
face, including lack of access to services, and building
awareness and agency of women. In addition, they act as a
pressure group in defending women’s interests and chan-
ging power dynamics at family and community levels. Fu-
ture efforts may do well to either build on these types of
groups; or incorporate their structural advantages, rather
than build new, institutionalized mechanisms afresh.
Endnotes
1Government workers are often ‘gatekeepers’ in such
contexts and possess the access to and knowledge of
committee/beneficiary lists that may be possible to by-
pass in a more prolonged study, but not in a rapidly exe-
cuted formative study.
2ASHAs are the backbone of the National Rural
Health Mission. They are the primary point of contact
for pregnant and lactating women and children to avail
of benefits and entitlements guaranteed under the
NRHM. ASHAs operate at village level and often they
are selected within the village they work in. This leads to
strong ties between ASHAs and women. AWWs, in-
stead, are in charge of delivering services mandated
under the Integrated Child Development Scheme
(ICDS) which include food rations and take-home ra-
tions, educational services for children under 6 and
measures to identify and contrast malnutrition. AWWs
operate at village level through Anganwadi Centres
(AWCs).
3The Court instructed that “… preferably ICDS funds
shall be spent by making use of village communities,
self-help groups and Mahila Mandals (Women’s groups)
for buying of grains and preparation of meals; Local
women’s Self Help Groups (SHGs) and Mahila Mandals
[Women’s Groups] should be encouraged to supply the
supplementary food distributed in Anganwadis centers.
They can make purchases, prepare the food locally, and
supervise the distribution.”
4NHM/NRHM monitoring efforts have been led at in-
stitutional level by the Advisory Group on Community
Action. This is a standing group established by the Minis-
try of Health which comprises public health professionals
associated with major NGOs and meets regularly to guide
activities relating to community action. AGCA coordi-
nated the first phase of Community Monitoring in nine
States of the country between 2007 and 2009 by coordin-
ating grassroots efforts with various groups such as com-
munity members and beneficiaries, community-based
organizations and NGOs working with communities,
along with panchayat representatives.
5To increase the members’ participation and engage-
ment, the following suggestions were raised: a) providing
meals for members (four respondents); b) ensuring the
AWW provides clear information on roles and responsi-
bilities of Committee members (three respondents); c)
allowing mothers with infants to attend the meetings; d)
arranging meetings with mothers (two respondents) and
e) provide the opportunity for those who are genuinely
interested in serving on the committee to replace mem-
bers who are not motivated (one respondent).
6TT shots, blood pressure tests and vaccinations are
some of the main services pregnant and lactating women
are entitled to under the National Rural Health Mission.
These are meant to be provided free of cost during preg-
nancy and after delivery.
7Types of identification cards often required to access
services and benefits.
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